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Abstract
It is well-known that laboratory subjects often do not play mixed strategy equilibria
games according to the theoretical predictions. However, little is known about the role
of cognition in these strategic settings. We conduct an experiment where subjects play
a repeated hide and seek game against a computer opponent. Subjects play with either
fewer available cognitive resources (high cognitive load treatment) or with more available
cognitive resources (low cognitive load treatment). Surprisingly, we nd some evidence
that subjects in the high load treatment earn more than subjects in the low treatment.
However, we also nd that subjects in the low treatment exhibit a greater rate of increase
in earnings across rounds, thus suggesting more learning. Our evidence is consistent with
subjects in the low load treatment over-experimenting. Further, while we observe that
subjects do not mix in the predicted proportions and that their actions exhibit serial
correlation, we do not nd strong evidence these are related to their available cognitive
resources. This suggests that the standard laboratory deviations from the theoretical
predictions are not associated with the availability of cognitive resources. Our results shed
light on the extent to which cognitive resources a¤ect (and do not a¤ect) behavior in games
with mixed strategy equilibria.
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1 Introduction
It is common to use the Nash equilibrium, or the mutual best response, as a prediction of
behavior in games. In games of conict, another prediction of behavior is minimax, whereby
the player can employ a strategy that guarantees a minimum payo¤. In zero-sum games, these
predictions coincide, thereby increasing the plausibility of these theoretical predictions.
In experimental settings, subjects often do not mix according to these theoretical pre-
dictions. They frequently deviate from the predicted mixture proportions and their actions
exhibit serial correlation.1 A criticism of this literature is that subjects are often inexperi-
enced in settings where strategic mixing is required. Prompted by this criticism, many studies
have examined mixing behavior in settings where decision makers have ample experience: the
eld.2 Although some deviations are still detected, this literature mostly nds that the mixing
in eld settings is closer to the theoretical predictions than in the laboratory.
In order to better understand the robustness of these deviations from the theoretical pre-
dictions, researchers have examined whether experience in mixing in a eld setting translates
to successfully mixing in a novel experimental setting.3 Our paper is complementary in that
we seek to better understand the role of cognition in games with mixed strategy equilibria.
Also similar to this literature, we are specically interested in the earnings of the subjects and
their conformity to the theoretical predictions.
To our knowledge, Geng, Peng, Shachat, and Zhong (2015) is the only other study that
investigates the relationship between cognition and mixing behavior.4 The authors do not nd
evidence that higher measures of cognitive ability5 are related to behavior consistent with the
1See ONeill (1987), Brown and Rosenthal (1990), Batzilis et al. (2017), Binmore, Swierzbinski, and Proulx
(2001), Geng, Peng, Shachat, and Zhong (2014), Mookherjee and Sopher (1994, 1997), ONeill (1991), Ochs
(1995), Palacios-Huerta and Volij (2008), Rapoport and Amaldoss (2000, 2004), Rapoport and Boebel (1992),
Rosenthal, Shachat, and Walker (2003), Shachat (2002), Van Essen and Wooders (2015). In fact, Martin et al.
(2014) nd evidence that chimpanzee subjects are closer to the theoretical predictions than human subjects.
2See Azar and Bar-Eli (2011), Bailey and McGarrity (2012), Bar-Eli et al. (2007), Buzzacchi and Pedrini
(2014), Chiappori, Levitt, and Groseclose (2002), Coloma (2007), Emara, Owens, Smith, and Wilmer (2017),
Hsu, Huang, and Tang (2007), Kovash and Levitt (2009), McGarrity and Linnen (2010), Palacios-Huerta
(2003a), Reed, Critcheld, and Martens (2006), Walker and Wooders (2001).
3See Palacios-Huerta and Volij (2008), Levitt, List, and Reiley (2010), and Van Essen and Wooders (2015).
4See Palacios-Huerta et al. (2014) for a study of brain activity during a game with a mixed strategy
equilibrium.
5Ravens standard progressive matrices test (Raven and De Lemos, 1990) and a score on a math test.
2
theoretical predictions: proportions of the mixture or serial correlation. Further, Geng et al.
do not nd a relationship between measures of cognitive ability and earnings in these games.
However, one potential drawback of employing measures of cognitive ability is that these
measures are possibly also correlated with other (observable or unobservable) characteristics
of the subjects, for instance educational opportunities. Thus, these correlations can make
inferences problematic.
We take a complementary approach as we seek to better understand behavior in games
with mixed strategy equilibria by experimentally manipulating the available cognitive re-
sources available to subjects. Our study follows other cognitive load experiments that observe
behavior or judgments while the subject has some information committed to memory. This
manipulation allows a within-subject design, in the sense that our subjects are placed into
di¤erent cognitive load treatments, and such is not possible with measures of cognitive ability.6
In our experiment, subjects are directed to either remember a large number (high cognitive
load treatment) or a small number (low cognitive load treatment).
In our design, subjects play against two distinct computer opponents7 in an experimental
session and are told of this fact. Each computer opponent is programmed to play either one
of two Exploitative strategies (designed to exploit suboptimal mixing by the subjects) or one
of two Naive strategies (designed to allow subjects the possibility of exploiting the computer).
Therefore, subjects face opponents who are playing only one of a few well-dened strategies,
and this facilitates the analysis of the extent to which the strategic behavior is optimal given
the strategy of the opponent. Further, using computer opponents in an experiment that
manipulates cognitive load avoids concerns regarding subjectsbeliefs about their opponents
cognitive load.
The cognitive load manipulation is designed to diminish the working memory capacity
6We note that Carpenter, Graham, and Wolf (2013) nd that the cognitive load manipulation is more
e¤ective on subjects with a higher measure of cognitive ability. However, Allred, Du¤y, and Smith (2016) do
not nd such a relationship. Here we nd some evidence of such a relationship. In particular, we nd that
higher measures of cognitive ability are associated with better strategic outcomes but that cognitive load can
mitigate this relationship.
7Also see Messick (1967), Fox (1972), Shachat and Swarthout (2004, 2012), Coricelli (2005), Levitt, List,
and Reiley (2010), Spiliopoulos (2012, 2013), Samson and Kostyszyn (2015), Shachat, Swarthout, and Wei
(2015), and Bayer and Renou (2016a).
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of subjects and to produce a diminished ability to make computations. Since both of these
abilities are important in learning, we aim to determine whether subjects in the high load
treatment have less success detecting and exploiting Naive computer strategies, and have less
success against Exploitative computer strategies. We therefore compare the payo¤s earned by
subjects in the cognitive load treatments. In addition, researchers have found that subjects
have di¢ culty detecting and producing random sequences.8 The ability to mix in a manner
consistent with the theoretical predictions would seem to be dependent on the computational
ability of the subject because it is a di¢ cult and subtle cognitive task. Therefore, we seek
to determine whether actions of subjects in the high load treatment are farther from the
theoretical predictions.
To our surprise, we nd some evidence that subjects in the high cognitive load treatment
earn more than subjects in the low load treatment. On the other hand, we nd that subjects
in the low load treatment exhibit an increase in earnings across rounds, whereas we do not
nd such a relationship for subjects in the high load treatment. In addition, we nd that
the response times of subjects in the low load treatment decrease at a faster rate than the
response times of subjects in the high load treatment. We interpret these results as suggesting
that subjects in the low cognitive load treatment exhibit a signicantly faster rate of learning
than do subjects in the high load treatment.
Further, consistent with the previous literature, the behavior in our experiment exhibits
mixture proportions and serial correlation that are inconsistent with the theoretical predic-
tions. However, we do not nd strong evidence that cognitive load is related to either the
mixing proportions or the serial correlation.
The contributions of this paper are as follows. We are the rst to attempt to better
understand mixing behavior by using the cognitive load manipulation. Our analysis also shows
that subjects with fewer cognitive resources do not necessarily exhibit worse performance,
particularly in the early rounds, than subjects with more cognitive resources. On the other
hand, early round experimentation, which would facilitate learning, can lead to lower payo¤s in
8For instance, see Wagenaar (1972), Bar-Hillel, and Wagenaar (1991), Rapoport and Budescu (1992),
Budescu and Rapoport (1994), Rabin (2002), and Oskarsson et al. (2009).
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these rounds. Our analysis suggests that subjects with more cognitive resources exhibit more
learning than subjects with fewer cognitive resources. This is consistent with the contention
that subjects in the low load treatment have the available cognitive resources to su¢ ciently
remember and analyze previous outcomes. However, the diminished payo¤s from the early
round experimentation are not compensated by a corresponding increase in payo¤s in the latter
rounds. We therefore refer to this as over-experimentation. Further, we do not nd strong
evidence that the standard experimental results on mixing (suboptimal mixture proportions
and serial correlation) are related to the available cognitive resources of the subject. Our
results shed light on the extent to which cognitive resources a¤ect (and do not a¤ect) behavior
in games with mixed strategy equilibria.
2 Related literature
There is a large and growing experimental literature that examines the relationship between
measures of cognitive ability and strategic behavior.9 We take a complementary approach in
that, rather than measure cognitive ability, we manipulate the subjectsavailable cognitive
resources.
The cognitive load manipulation is well-studied in nonstrategic settings. Cognitive load
has been found to make subjects more impulsive and less analytical (Hinson, Jameson, and
Whitney, 2003), more risk averse (Whitney, Rinehart, and Hinson, 2008; Benjamin, Brown,
and Shapiro, 2013; Gerhardt, Biele, Heekeren, and Uhlig, 2016), more impatient (Benjamin,
Brown, and Shapiro, 2013), make more mistakes (Rydval, 2011),10 exhibit less self control
over their actions (Shiv and Fedorikhin, 1999; Ward and Mann, 2000, Mann and Ward, 2007),
9See Al-Ubaydli, Jones, and Weel (2016), Ballinger et al. (2011), Baghestanian and Frey (2016), Bayer
and Renou (2016a,2016b), Benito-Ostolaza, Hernández, and Sanchis-Llopis (2016), Brañas-Garza, Espinosa,
and Rey-Biel (2011), Brañas-Garza, Garcia-Muñoz, and Hernan Gonzalez (2012), Brañas-Garza and Smith
(2016), Burks et al. (2009), Burnham et al. (2009), Carpenter, Graham, and Wolf (2013), Chen, Huang, and
Wang (2018), Corgnet et al. (2016), Coricelli and Nagel (2009), Devetag and Warglien (2003), Fehr and Huck
(2016), Georganas, Healy, and Weber (2015), Gill and Prowse (2016), Grimm and Mengel (2012), Jones (2014),
Jones (2008), Kiss, Rodriguez-Lara, and Rosa-García (2016), Lohse (2016), Palacios-Huerta (2003b), Proto,
Rustichini, and Soanos (2018), Putterman, Tyran, and Kamei (2011), Rydval (2011), Rydval and Ortmann
(2004), and Schnusenberg and Gallo (2011).
10Drichoutis and Nayga (2018) nd that high cognitive load does not increase internal inconsistency on a
GARP budget allocation task. Lee, Amir, and Ariely (2009) nd that subjects under a high load make fewer
intransitive choices.
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fail to process available and relevant information (Gilbert, Pelham, and Krull, 1988; Swann
et al., 1990), more susceptible to anchoring e¤ects (Epley and Gilovich, 2006), perform worse
on gambling tasks (Hinson, Jameson, and Whitney, 2002), perform worse on visual judgment
tasks (Morey and Cowan, 2004; Allen, Baddeley, and Hitch, 2006; Morey and Bieler, 2013;
Zokaei, Heider, and Husain, 2014; Allred, Crawford, Du¤y, and Smith, 2016), o¤er di¤erent
allocation decisions (Cornelissen, Dewitte, and Warlop, 2011; Schulz et al., 2014),11 give
di¤erent evaluations of the fairness of outcomes (van den Bos et al., 2006), less dishonest
(vant Veer, Stel, and van Beest, 2014), and more inuenced by visual salience (Milosavljevic,
Navalpakkam, Koch, and Rangel, 2012).12
While many cognitive load studies occur in individual decision settings, only a few involve
strategic settings, and none entail the study of mixing behavior. To our knowledge, studies
of cognitive load in strategic settings only include Milinski and Wedekind (1998), Roch et al.
(2000), Cappelletti, Güth, and Ploner (2011), Carpenter, Graham, and Wolf (2013), Du¤y and
Smith (2014), Samson and Kostyszyn (2015), Allred, Du¤y, and Smith (2016), and Buckert,
Oechssler, and Schwieren (2017).
We note that Milinski and Wedekind (1998), Du¤y and Smith (2014), and Buckert,
Oechssler, and Schwieren (2017) study the e¤ect of cognitive load on behavior in repeated
game settings. The authors nd that the cognitive load a¤ects the ability of subjects in
repeated games to employ information from previous repetitions.
With the exception of Carpenter et al. (2013) and Samson and Kostyszyn (2015), the pre-
vious literature on cognitive load in strategic settings describe experiments where the subjects
are placed under a cognitive load and play against a human opponent, who is either under a
cognitive load or not. One of the drawbacks of conducting a cognitive load experiment in a
strategic setting with a human opponent is that the subjectsbeliefs about the distribution
of the cognitive load of the opponents and their beliefs about the e¤ect of the cognitive load
on their opponents are not well specied and are di¢ cult to measure. A design such as ours,
which employs a computer opponent, can address this critique. Further, it allows us to ob-
11Although Hauge et al. (2016) does not nd an e¤ect.
12Deck and Jahedi (2015) study several e¤ects at a time and nd that subjects under a cognitive load are
less patient, more risk averse, perform worse on arithmetic tasks, and are more prone to anchoring e¤ects.
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serve the e¤ect of cognitive load on subjects playing against a small set of distinct varieties of
opponent strategies.
3 Experimental design
3.1 Hide and seek game
Subjects play a repeated, deterministic version of the zero-sum, "hide and seek" game (Rosen-
thal, Shachat, and Walker, 2003) against a computer opponent while under an experimentally
manipulated cognitive load.
Subjects select either "Up" or "Down" as the "Evader" and the computer selects either Up
or Down as the "Pursuer." Subjects always play as the row player.13 If the computer correctly
guesses the subjects choice then the subject earns 0. The payo¤ to the two outcomes char-
acterized as successful evasion ({Up,Down} and {Down,Up}) are unequal, with one yielding
a payo¤ of 2 points to the Evader, and the other 1 point. To mitigate concerns about order
or presentation e¤ects, sessions were conducted in which both successful evasion outcomes
yield the higher payo¤. Both of the corresponding payo¤ matrices are presented in Figure 1.
Roughly half of the subjects played the version on the left.
Pursuer
Up Down
Evader Up 0 1
Down 2 0
Pursuer
Up Down
Evader Up 0 2
Down 1 0
Figure 1: Both versions of the hide and seek game, where Evader payo¤s are provided
Each point corresponded to $1:50. The computers actions were presented in red, and the
subjects actions and payo¤s were presented in blue. We provide a screenshot in Figure 2.
<<Figure 2 here>>
13 In Rosenthal, Shachat, and Walker (2003), actions were labeled "Left" and "Right" and the roles as both
row and column were played by subjects.
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To simplify the analysis that follows, we recode the data from both treatments to corre-
spond to the game on the left, where successfully evading with Down earns 2. Subjects play
100 repetitions of the same version of the game. Following each game stage, subjects receive
feedback for that period, including their action, the action of the computer opponent, and the
amount of points earned in that period.
3.2 Theoretical predictions
Subject could guarantee a minimum expected payo¤ of 23 by playing the minimax strategy:
randomly and independently playing Up with probability 23 and Down with probability
1
3 . In
the zero-sum version of the game, the Pursuer would seek to keep the subject at the minimum
expected payo¤, and this would be accomplished by playing Up with probability 13 and Down
with probability 23 . We refer to this strategy of the Pursuer as the minimax strategy.
14
3.3 Computer opponent strategies
Subjects are randomly allocated into computer opponent strategy treatments. There are two
Naive computer strategies. These are strategies that, once detected, can be exploited by
subjects in a straightforward manner. One of these Naive computer strategies mixes between
Up and Down with equal probability.15 We refer to this as the Naive 50   50 strategy. The
best response to this strategy is to play Down in each period.16
The other Naive computer strategy mixes with the overall frequency corresponding to
the theoretical predictions, but in the deterministic pattern of Up-Down-Down-(repeat). We
refer to this as the Naive Pattern strategy. The best response to this strategy is to play
Down-Up-Up-(repeat).
There are two Exploitative computer strategies. One plays the rst 5 periods according
to the minimax strategy: Up with probability 13 and Down with probability
2
3 . Then in the
14These strategies are identical to the equilibrium of the zero-sum version of the game.
15This computer opponent strategy also appears in Shachat and Swarthout (2004) and Levitt, List, and
Reiley (2010).
16 In Shachat and Swarthout (2004), subjects played against computer opponents that selected their actions
according to a xed probability distribution. The 50-50 mixture is near the threshold where their subjects notice
that their opponent is not playing optimally. We also note that their experiment did not contain cognitive load
treatments and their subjects played against this strategy for 200 rounds.
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remaining 45 repetitions, the computer plays the minimax strategy with probability 0:5 and
with probability 0:5 selects the action that would have minimized the subjects payo¤s given
the proportion of the subjects previous 4 decisions.17 We refer to this as the Exploitative Mix
strategy.
The other Exploitative strategy also begins playing the minimax strategy for the rst 5
periods, then in the remaining 45 repetitions plays the minimax strategy with probability 0:5
and seeks to exploit the Win-Stay-Lose-Shift tendency18 with probability 0:5. In particular,
if a subject displays behavior consistent with the Win-Stay-Lose-Shift strategy in 2 or 3 of
the previous 3 decisions then the computer selects the action that minimizes the subjects
payo¤s anticipating the Win-Stay-Lose-Shift strategy. On the other hand, if a subject exhibits
behavior consistent with the Win-Stay-Lose-Shift strategy in 0 or 1 of the previous 3 decisions
then the computer selects the action that minimizes the subjects payo¤s anticipating the
Win-Shift-Lose-Stay strategy. We refer to this as the Exploitative WSLS strategy.
Each subject plays 50 consecutive rounds against a Naive computer strategy and 50 con-
secutive rounds against an Exploitative computer strategy. With probability 0:5 subjects rst
play against a Naive computer opponent. Subjects are not informed about whether their
opponent strategy is Naive or Exploitative.
In order to strike a balance between revealing too little to the subjects and too much to the
subjects, we told them the following about the computer strategies: Before the rst period,
subjects were told, "How does the computer decide what to play? A number of possible
strategies have been programmed. Some computer strategies can be exploited by you. Some
computer strategies are designed to exploit you. One of these possible strategies has been
selected for the rst 50 periods." After the rst 50 periods, subjects were told, "The computer
strategy from the rst 50 periods is denitely not the same as that in the second 50 periods."
17A similar non-stationary computer opponent strategy appears in Levitt, List, and Reiley (2010).
18See Imhof, Fudenberg, and Nowak (2007), Spiliopoulos (2013), Wang and Xu (2014), and Wang, Xu, and
Zhou (2014).
9
3.4 Cognitive load treatments
Before each repetition of the game, a cognitive load is imposed on subjects by directing them
to remember a number. Subjects in the low cognitive load treatment are required to remember
a one-digit number that ranges from 1 to 9. Subjects in the high cognitive load treatment are
required to remember a six-digit number that ranges from 100000 to 999999. Each number is
independently drawn with replacement from a uniform distribution on the specied range.
In both treatments, a new number is given for each period. After playing an iteration of the
game and receiving feedback, subjects are asked for the number. Subjects play 50 consecutive
repetitions in the high load treatment and 50 consecutive repetitions in the low load treatment.
In this sense, cognitive load is a within-subject manipulation. With probability 0:5 subjects
play rst in the high load treatment. Subjects are not given feedback about their performance
on the memorization tasks.
3.5 Incentivization scheme
Each subject earns a $5 show-up fee. Additional payments are designed to decouple the ma-
terial incentives from the game in any period with material incentives from the memorization
task in that period. Subjects complete 100 repetitions of the game and 100 memorization
tasks. Those who correctly complete all 100 memorization tasks are paid for 30 randomly
selected game outcomes, those who correctly complete 99 are paid for 29, those who correctly
complete 98 are paid for 28, and so on, until subjects who correctly complete 70 or fewer
memorization tasks are not paid for any of the game outcomes.
3.6 Experimental procedure
At the start of every period, subjects were given 15 seconds to commit a number to memory19
then proceeded to the game.20 After receiving feedback on the game21 they were asked for the
19Subjects could click to proceed to the next stage but after 15 seconds would proceed automatically.
20Subjects were given 20 seconds to reect on their action in the game. They could click to proceed to the
next stage but there was no penalty for not responding before the 20 seconds elapsed.
21Subjects were given 20 seconds to reect on the game feedback. They could click to proceed to the next
stage but after 20 seconds would proceed automatically.
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memorization number. Finally, subjects were informed of the number of periods completed
(out of 50) under the computer opponent strategy and cognitive load treatments.22
Prior to the incentivized games and memorization tasks, subjects were given an unincen-
tivized test of their understanding of the hide and seek game. Specically, they were asked to
report the number of points that they would earn for all 4 combinations of own actions and
computer actions. They received feedback on these responses. In addition, they were given an
unincentivized opportunity to memorize a six-digit number and an unincentivized opportunity
to memorize a one-digit number. Unlike the incentivized portion of the experiment, subjects
were given feedback about their performance on these memorization tasks.
After completing the incentivized portion of the experiment, subjects reported their gender,
whether they were an economics major, whether they have taken a game theory course, an
optional estimate of their grade point average23 (GPA), and a rating of the di¢ culty in recalling
the large and the small memorization numbers. These di¢ culty ratings were elicited on a
scale of 1 ("Very Di¢ cult") to 7 ("Not Very Di¢ cult"). After these questions were completed,
subjects learned their earnings. Subsequently, the experimenter took an image of the right
hand of the subjects with a digital scanner24 and then they were paid in cash.25
A total of 130 subjects participated in the experiment. The experiment was programmed
and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).26 Of the 130 subjects, 78 were
students at Rutgers University-Camden and 52 were students at Haverford College.27 There
were 13 sessions conducted at Camden and 3 at Haverford. None of the 16 sessions lasted
longer than 60minutes and the subjects earned an average of $33. Table 1 lists the distribution
of subjects within the cognitive load and computer opponent treatments.28
22Subjects could click to proceed to the next period but would automatically do so after 10 seconds.
23Grade point average ranges from 0:0 to 4:0, and is increasing in performance.
24We employed a Canon CanoScan 4507B002 LiDE110 Color Image Scanner. We report the analysis of this
data in Du¤y et al. (2018).
25Screenshots of the entire set of instructions are available at https://osf.io/bha7c/.
26The z-Tree code is available at https://osf.io/bha7c/.
27The Haverford subjects were recruited via ORSEE (Greiner, 2015).
28See Table A1, in the Supplemental Online Appendix, for more on the distribution in the rst and second
blocks of 50 rounds.
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Table 1: Distribution of subjects within treatments
High load Low load Total
Naive 50-50 32 37 69
Naive Pattern 22 39 61
Expl. WSLS 37 27 64
Expl. Mix 39 27 66
Total 130 130 260
We list the distribution of subjects across cognitive load and computer opponent
treatments. There are a total of 260 observations because each of the 130 subjects
played against both a Naive and an Exploitative computer opponent strategy and
played a block in the high cognitive load treatment and a block in the low cognitive
load treatment.
3.7 Discussion of the experimental design
We employ only 4 strategies for the computer opponent. As a result, we can compare strategic
behavior against a few well-dened opponent strategies. In the case of human opponents, the
number of these strategies would either be unknown or only vaguely dened. Further, we
allude to the Naive and Exploitative strategies in the description to the subjects because these
communicate the range of possible computer strategies. Moreover, this description increases
the plausibility of the claim that the computer strategy is not identical in both blocks of 50
rounds.
In the Exploitative computer strategies, the computer attempts exploitation with prob-
ability 0:5, rather than with certainty. A deterministic strategy could be detected by some
subjects, rendering this strategy easier to exploit.
Given the Exploitative strategies, the reader might ask why the subject should mix. The
answer, applicable to all strategies of the opponent, is that mixing according to minimax is the
only way to avoid being exploited and attaining an expected payo¤ of less than 23 . Further,
any concerns about incentives to mix against our Exploitative strategies also apply to settings
with human opponents.
Recall that subjects memorize a di¤erent number every period, keeping cognitive load
relatively constant across periods. On the other hand, memorizing only a single number
across several periods could produce a non-constant load, as the number could be rehearsed
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across periods. It is not known whether this taxing of cognitive resources would increase or
decrease across periods, however it would likely not be constant. We also note that we did
not exclude repeated numbers or numbers that we considered to be easier to remember than
other numbers.
Computer strategies, both Naive and Exploitative, are only vaguely described to subjects
as "...can be exploited by you..." and "...designed to exploit you..." We acknowledge that the
meaning of these sentences may be ambiguous to some subjects. However, it is important to
the design of the experiment so that subjects attempt to discern a strategy on the part of
the computer, and direct cognitive resources towards this goal. Our language claries that
a motivation can be discerned. Language that more precisely species the four strategies
has two potential drawbacks. First, anything specic about the strategies themselves would
render all four of them too easy to exploit. Second, wording that pins down the computers
game-theoretic motivation29 could exacerbate di¤erences between subjects who are familiar
with game theory or economics, and those who are not. Our description was selected because
it claries that subjects should try to learn something about the computer opponent without
being specic about its precise nature.
The goals of our incentive scheme are as follows: strongly incentivize the memorization
task, keep incentives for memorization in each period independent from incentives for the
game decision in that particular period, and maintain identical game decision incentives for
high and low load memorization periods. Our solution to this is to not provide feedback
on the memorization task and to pay a number of randomly selected game outcomes that is
decreasing in the number of incorrect memorization tasks. Only 1 subject out of 130 failed
to correctly perform at least 70 memorization tasks, suggesting that the incentive scheme was
properly calibrated. In addition, as feedback was not given on the memorization task, it is
not clear whether subjects realized that they were near or below 70 correct. Finally, while
incorrectly answering a memorization task decreases incentives, this a¤ects high and low load
trials equally and we are primarily interested in the di¤erence between these treatments.
29For example, the instructions could have explained "Some computer opponents are programmed to detect
and best-respond to your strategy."
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The reader might worry about the design feature that we allowed subjects to a¤ect the
timing of when they proceed to the next stage. In particular, the reader might argue that it
would have been preferable to force the subjects to remain in the game stage for a xed period
of time.
First, it is not clear what the ideal compelled response time would be. Out of 13,000 game
decisions, only 612 (4.7%) took longer than 3 seconds, only 360 (2.8%) took longer than 4
seconds, only 220 (1.7%) took longer than 5 seconds, and only 42 (0.3%) took longer than 10
seconds. Either the compelled response time would be fast and would greatly a¤ect behavior
or it would not be fast and would only a¤ect a small number of decisions.
Further, if a response time is compelled, it is not clear how the game should proceed if the
subject does not o¤er a response within the window provided. Does the program randomly
select an action for the subject? Does the computer opponent regard this selection as the
same as if it was selected by the subject? Would the subject treat this round di¤erently than
a round where the action was selected by the subject? In a sequence of one-shot games, these
matters are not important. However, in a game such as ours, with a repeated nature, these
matters are important. In the end, it is our opinion that allowing subjects to proceed at their
own pace is the best design.
Finally, we load subjects during the feedback stage because we want to leave subjects
with less unloaded time for deliberation. For instance, during the feedback stage, subjects
could simply decide on the action for the subsequent period. This would circumvent the load
treatment during the decision stage.
4 Results
4.1 Summary statistics
We begin with the summary statistics of the main variables of interest.30 Correct is a dummy
variable indicating that the memorization task is correctly completed, Down is a dummy in-
dicating that the Down action is selected, and Earnings is the amount earned in a particular
30The dataset is available at https://osf.io/bha7c/.
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game outcome: 0, 1, or 2 points. Female, Economics, and Game Theory are dummies indicat-
ing gender, that the subject was an economics major, and that the subject reported having
taken a game theory course. GPA refers to the subjects self-reported grade point average.
Table 2 lists the means of these variables and Table 3 lists the mean Earnings and Down
within the cognitive load and computer opponent treatments.
Table 2: Summary statistics
Pooled High load Low load
Correct 0:929 0:880 0:979
Down 0:555 0:551 0:558
Earnings 0:733 0:737 0:730
Female 0:531 - -
Economics 0:169 - -
Game Theory 0:177 - -
GPA (optional) 3:365 - -
The Pooled means for Correct, Down, and Earnings have 13,000 observations.
Female, Economics, and Game Theory have 130 observations. GPA has 103 ob-
servations. Both the High load and the Low load means have 6500 observations.
Table 3: Earnings and Down within treatments
High load Low load Total
Naive 50-50 0:779 0:794 0:787
(0:615) (0:585) (0:599)
Naive Pattern 0:855 0:753 0:790
(0:494) (0:524) (0:513)
Expl. WSLS 0:707 0:735 0:719
(0:559) (0:568) (0:563)
Expl. Mix 0:664 0:601 0:638
(0:523) (0:561) (0:538)
We provide mean Earnings and Down (in parentheses) by treatment. The
number of observations within each cell is 50 for every subject in the treatment,
as indicated in Table 1. We perform a one-sample t-test about whether Earnings
are signicantly di¤erent than the theoretical prediction of 0:6667.  denotes
p < 0:001,  denotes p < 0:01,  denotes p < 0:05, and y denotes p < 0:1.
We observe that only the Exploitative Mix, high load treatment is not signicantly di¤erent
than the theoretical prediction. The Naive-Exploitative strategy treatments are successful in
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that Earnings against Naive opponents is larger than that against Exploitative opponents,
according to a Mann-Whitney test Z =  7:56, p < 0:001. Table 4 reports the Spearman
correlation coe¢ cients.
Table 4: Spearman non-parametric correlation coe¢ cients
1 2 3 4 5 6
1 Correct 1:00
2 Down 0:011 1:00
3 Earnings 0:008 0:034 1:00
4 Female  0:014  0:004  0:023 1:00
5 Economics  0:008  0:005 0:005  0:316 1:00
6 Game Theory  0:007  0:018 0:012  0:210 0:436 1:00
7 GPA (optional) 0:077 0:007 0:025 0:076  0:234  0:065
Each correlation between variables 1, 2, or 3, and variables 4, 5, or 6 has
13,000 observations. Each correlation between variables 1, 2, or 3, and variable
7 has 10,3000 observations. Each correlation between variables 4, 5, or 6, and
variable 7 has 103 observations. Each correlation among variables 1, 2, and 3
has 13; 000 observations. Each correlation among variables 4, 5, and 6 has 130
observations.  denotes p < 0:001,  denotes p < 0:01,  denotes p < 0:05, and
y denotes p < 0:1.
We observe that higher GPA subjects tend to earn more and are more likely to correctly
perform the memorization task. While we do not observe a relationship between Earnings and
either Economics or Game Theory, we observe a negative relationship between Earnings and
Female. Finally, we do not observe a correlation between Earnings and either Economics or
Game Theory. This suggests that our description of the computer strategies did not advantage
those with exposure to the study of games.31
We dene Round to be the number of periods under a particular computer opponent
treatment and cognitive load treatment. Therefore, Round ranges from 1 to 50. Figures 3 and
4 demonstrate Earnings and Down across Rounds.
<<Figures 3 and 4 Here>>
The high load memorization tasks are correct (5718 of 6500) with a signicantly lower fre-
quency than the low load memorization tasks (6362 of 6500), according to a Mann-Whitney
31Apparently, being an economics major is not good for ones GPA: we note a negative relationship between
GPA and Economics.
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test Z =  22:03, p < 0:001. This suggests that our cognitive load manipulation is successful32
although it should be noted that the success rate is relatively high in the high load treat-
ment. As each of the 130 subjects attempt 50 high load memorization tasks and 50 low load
memorization tasks, Table 5 presents a characterization of the subject-level distribution of the
number of correct memorization tasks by cognitive load treatment and the number pooled
across treatments.
Table 5: Distribution of subjects by number of correct memorization tasks
Within blocks of 50
46  50 41  45 36  40 31  35 26  30 23  25 < 23 Total
High load 72 30 13 10 2 3 0 130
Low load 125 5 0 0 0 0 0 130
Across both blocks of 50
96  100 91  95 86  90 81  85 76  80 71  75 < 71 Total
Pooled 64 31 16 11 5 2 1 130
The upper panel characterizes the subject-level distribution of the number of
correct memorization tasks by cognitive load treatment. The lower panel charac-
terizes the subject-level distribution of the correct memorization tasks across both
cognitive load treatments.
Table 5 shows that 111 of the 130 subjects successfully completed more than 85% of
their memorization tasks correctly. This suggests that the incentives were su¢ cient to elicit
cognitive e¤ort on these tasks.
Recall that the incentive scheme is designed to keep incentives for memorization in each
period independent from incentives for the game decision in that period. Therefore, even if
the subject is condent that the memorization task would not be correctly completed in that
period, the subject should exert e¤ort in the game stage. Even if the reader acknowledges
that the design implements this goal, it is possible that the subjects did not act accordingly.
In order to investigate this possibility, we conduct an analysis of earnings while restricting
attention to a specic cognitive load treatment. We use the Correct variable as the indepen-
dent variable. In some of the regressions below, we include dummy variables identifying the
32As a robustness check, we run a repeated measures logistic regression with Correct as the dependent
variable and High load as the independent variable. The High load estimate is negative and signicant, t =
 13:56, p < 0:001.
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computer opponent treatment. In addition, we consider specications that account for the
repeated nature of the observations. In these repeated measures regressions, we estimate an
exchangeable covariance matrix, clustered by subject. In other words, we assume a unique
correlation between any two observations involving a particular subject. However, we assume
that observations involving two di¤erent subjects are statistically independent. We also con-
sider specications that control for Female, Economics, and Game Theory. We refer to this
collection of variables as Demographics. We also account for self-reported GPA. Recall that a
response to GPA was optional and only 103 of 130 subjects provided a response. In the upper
panel we report the results restricted to the high load treatment and in the lower panel we
report the results from the low load treatment. This analysis is summarized in Table 6.
Table 6: Earnings restricted to cognitive load treatment
High load
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Correct 0:018  0:001  0:007  0:005  0:006
(0:031) (0:031) (0:031) (0:031) (0:035)
Strategy dummies No Y es Y es Y es Y es
Repeated measures No No Y es Y es Y es
Demographics No No No Y es Y es
GPA No No No No Y es
AIC 15660 15630 15607 15617 12373
Observations 6500 6500 6500 6500 5150
Low load
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Correct 0:079 0:087 0:072 0:073 0:053
(0:069) (0:069) (0:069) (0:069) (0:075)
Strategy dummies No Y es Y es Y es Y es
Repeated measures No No Y es Y es Y es
Demographics No No No Y es Y es
GPA No No No No Y es
AIC 15632 15601 15545 15554 12358
Observations 6500 6500 6500 6500 5150
In the upper panel we report the results restricted to the high load treatment
and in the lower panel we report the results from the low load treatment. The
repeated measures regressions estimate an exchangeable covariance matrix, clus-
tered by subject. We do not provide the estimates of the intercepts, the individual
demographics variables, the covariance estimates, or the strategy dummies. AIC
refers to the Akaike information criterion (Akaike, 1974). y denotes p < 0:1.
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In none of the specications is there a relationship between Correct and Earnings. This
suggests that, even if subjects incorrectly perform the memorization task, there are no signif-
icant di¤erences in their earnings.33
4.2 Earnings di¤erences
Now we examine di¤erences in earnings by cognitive load treatment. We conduct regressions
similar to that in Table 6, but we also include the interactions between High load and the
strategy dummies. Including these interactions is attractive in that it does not assume that
the cognitive load treatment will have the same e¤ect in each computer opponent treatment.
However, these interactions make the interpretation of the High load coe¢ cient more di¢ cult.
We therefore include di¤erences in Least Square Means (LSM) estimates34 of the earnings in
the high and low load treatments. This analysis is summarized in Table 7.
Table 7: Regressions of Earnings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
High load 0:007 0:063 0:069 0:079 0:097 0:422
(0:014) (0:028) (0:033) (0:033) (0:037) (0:124)
GPA         0:046 0:093
(0:023) (0:029)
GPA*High load            0:097
(0:035)
Strategy dummies No Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Repeated measures No No Y es Y es Y es Y es
Demographics No No No Y es Y es Y es
AIC 31283:0 31221:7 31199:0 31212:3 24767:3 24764:7
Observations 13,000 13,000 13,000 13,000 10,300 10,300
LSM Di¤erence:
High load-Low load 0:007 0:030 0:030 0:029 0:047 0:048
(0:014) (0:014) (0:014) (0:014) (0:016) (0:016)
The repeated measures regressions estimate an exchangeable covariance ma-
trix, clustered by subject. We do not provide the estimates of the intercepts, the
individual demographics variables, the covariance estimates, the strategy dum-
mies, or the High load-strategy dummies interactions. AIC refers to the Akaike
33 In order to address the concern that the Correct variable does not su¢ ciently capture whether the subject
knows that the memorization task will be incorrect, we o¤er a di¤erent specication in Table A2 in the
Supplementary Online Appendix. Our results are robust to this specication.
34The earnings estimates at the population means.
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information criterion (Akaike, 1974). LSM refers to the Least Square Means. 
denotes p < 0:001,  denotes p < 0:01,  denotes p < 0:05, and y denotes p < 0:1.
In each specication that includes strategy dummies, we nd that subjects in the high
cognitive load treatment earn a signicantly larger amount than subjects in the low load
treatment.35 We also nd a positive relationship between GPA and Earnings. However, the
estimate of the GPA-High load interaction suggests the positive relationship between GPA
and Earnings is driven by subjects in the low load treatment.36 ;37
4.3 Earnings di¤erences across rounds
To better understand the evidence for higher earnings in the high cognitive load treatment, we
now consider the trajectory of earnings across rounds. We dene Second half to be a dummy
variable indicating whether the round was in the second half of the block of 50. In other words,
for the rst 25 rounds within the block of 50, the Second half variable is 0, and 1 otherwise.
Other than the inclusion of the Second half variable and the interaction of Second half and
High load, the analysis is identical to that summarized in Table 7. As we are interested in the
di¤erences across rounds, we provide the LSM estimates of the di¤erences in the estimates
in the second half and the rst half of rounds, for both cognitive load treatments. We also
provide the LSM estimates of the di¤erences in the high and the low cognitive load treatments
for both the rst half and the second half of rounds. This analysis is summarized in Table 8.
35Table A3 in the Supplimentary Online Appendix performs regression (3) but restricted by computer
opponent treatment.
36The reader might worry about whether high cognitive load in the rst block of 50 a¤ects behavior in the
second block. We therefore supplemented the regressions in Table 7 with a First block dummy variable and
its interaction with High load. We nd that First block dummy is positive and signicant at 0.05, and we nd
that the interaction is not signicant. This perhaps indicates that subjects experienced fatigue in the second
block, regardless of the load in the rst block. This analysis is available from the corresponding author upon
request.
37 In regressions (4)  (6) we note that neither the Economics nor the Game Theory variables are signicant.
This suggests that our description of the computer strategies did not advantage those with an exposure to the
study of games.
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Table 8: Regressions of Earnings across rounds
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
High load 0:043 0:099 0:105 0:115 0:130 0:455
(0:01998) (0:032) (0:036) (0:036) (0:040) (0:125)
Second half 0:054 0:054 0:054 0:054 0:050 0:050
(0:020) (0:020) (0:020) (0:020) (0:022) (0:022)
Second half*High load  0:072  0:072  0:072  0:072  0:066  0:066
(0:028) (0:028) (0:028) (0:028) (0:032) (0:032)
GPA         0:046 0:093
(0:023) (0:029)
GPA*High load            0:097
(0:035)
Strategy dummies No Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Repeated measures No No Y es Y es Y es Y es
Demographics No No No Y es Y es Y es
AIC 31287:0 31225:6 31202:8 31216:2 24773:4 24770:7
Observations 13; 000 13,000 13,000 13,000 10,300 10,300
LSM Di¤erences:
High load-Low load 0:043 0:066 0:066 0:065 0:080 0:081
for First half (0:020) (0:020) (0:020) (0:020) (0:023) (0:023)
High load-Low load  0:029  0:006  0:006  0:007 0:014 0:015
for Second half (0:020) (0:020) (0:020) (0:020) (0:023) (0:023)
Second half-First half  0:018  0:018  0:018  0:018  0:017  0:017
for High load (0:020) (0:020) (0:020) (0:020) (0:022) (0:022)
Second half-First half 0:054 0:054 0:054 0:054 0:050 0:050
for Low load (0:020) (0:020) (0:020) (0:020) (0:022) (0:022)
The repeated measures regressions estimate an exchangeable covariance ma-
trix, clustered by subject. We do not provide the estimates of the intercepts, the
individual demographics variables, the covariance estimates, the strategy dum-
mies, or the High load-strategy dummies interactions. AIC refers to the Akaike
information criterion (Akaike, 1974). LSM refers to the Least Square Means. 
denotes p < 0:001,  denotes p < 0:01,  denotes p < 0:05, and y denotes p < 0:1.
Within the rst half of rounds, Earnings are higher in the high cognitive load treatment
than in the low cognitive load treatment. However, there is no signicant di¤erence between
these in the second half of rounds. We also observe that the subjects in the low load treatment
exhibit higher Earnings in the second half than in the rst half of rounds. On the other hand,
in the high cognitive load treatment, Earnings in the second half are lower than those in the
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rst half, although this di¤erence is not signicant.38 ;39
These results are consistent with the claim that subjects in the low treatment are ex-
perimenting in early rounds and beneting from this experimentation in the latter rounds.
By contrast, Earnings in the high cognitive load treatment do not indicate that the subjects
experimented. However, it seems as if the experimentation in the low load treatment is ex-
cessive in that the early round diminished earnings associated with the experimentation are
not su¢ ciently compensated by improved earnings in the latter rounds. We consider this to
be evidence of over-experimentation.
4.4 Di¤erences in response time
Research nds a positive relationship between the time spent deciding on a choice and the
di¢ culty of the choice.40 In other words, decisions where one option is clearly better than
the others tends to take less time than decisions where this is not the case. We dene the
Response time to be the time spent deliberating on the decision. Therefore, a higher value
indicates more time spent on the game decision.
Somewhat surprisingly, in the Naive opponent treatments, subjects in the high load treat-
ment (mean = 0:704, SD = 0:470) have longer Response times than subjects in the low
load treatment (mean = 0:627, SD = 0:496), according to a Mann-Whitney test, Z = 6:206,
p < 0:001. However, in the Exploitative opponent treatments, subjects in the high load treat-
ment (mean = 0:589, SD = 0:476) have shorter Response times than subjects in the low load
treatment (mean = 0:728, SD = 0:508), according to a Mann-Whitney test, Z = 11:288,
p < 0:001.
In order to better understand the analysis of Earnings across rounds, here we study Re-
sponse time across rounds. Figure 5 illustrates Response time across rounds.
<<Figure 5 here>>
38Table A4 in the Supplimentary Online Appendix performs regression (3) but restricted by computer
opponent treatment.
39See Tables A5 and A6 in the Supplimentary Online Appendix for a similar analysis but with Round, rather
than Second half, as an independent variable.
40See Wilcox (1993), Mo¤att (2005), Rubinstein (2007), Alós-Ferrer, Grani´c, Shi, and Wagner (2012), Chen
and Fischbacher (2015), and Alós-Ferrer, Grani´c, Kern, and Wagner (2016).
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We run the analogous regressions as summarized in Table 8 but we employ Response
time as the dependent variable. Because Response time is constrained to be nonnegative, we
perform the analysis by taking the natural log of Response time. We note that Response
time ranges from 0 to 29 seconds. However, our z-Tree output lists response times in integers.
Presumably, responses in less than 0:5 seconds are reported as 0.41 In order to avoid taking
the log of 0, we add 1 to all values. This analysis is summarized in Table 9.
Table 9: Regressions of the natural log of Response time across rounds
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
High load  0:053  0:191  0:236  0:212  0:214  0:333
(0:012) (0:019) (0:047) (0:048) (0:056) (0:084)
Second half  0:189  0:189  0:189  0:189  0:169  0:169
(0:012) (0:012) (0:010) (0:010) (0:012) (0:012)
Second half*High load 0:042 0:042 0:042 0:042 0:017 0:017
(0:017) (0:017) (0:015) (0:015) (0:016) (0:016)
GPA         0:020 0:003
(0:055) (0:056)
GPA*High load           0:036y
(0:019)
Strategy dummies No Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Repeated measures No No Y es Y es Y es Y es
Demographics No No No Y es Y es Y es
AIC 18004:5 17789:0 14504:4 14510:8 11456:0 11458:5
Observations 13; 000 13,000 13,000 13,000 10,300 10,300
LSM Di¤erences:
High load-Low load  0:053  0:049  0:053  0:053  0:027  0:027
for First half (0:012) (0:012) (0:010) (0:010) (0:012) (0:012)
High load-Low load  0:011  0:007  0:011  0:011  0:010  0:010
for Second half (0:012) (0:012) (0:010) (0:010) (0:012) (0:012)
Second half-First half  0:147  0:147  0:147  0:147  0:152  0:152
for High load (0:012) (0:012) (0:010) (0:010) (0:012) (0:012)
Second half-First half  0:189  0:189  0:189  0:189  0:169  0:169
for Low load (0:012) (0:012) (0:010) (0:010) (0:012) (0:012)
The repeated measures regressions estimate an exchangeable covariance ma-
trix, clustered by subject. We do not provide the estimates of the intercepts, the
individual demographics variables, the covariance estimates, the strategy dum-
mies, or the High load-strategy dummies interactions. AIC refers to the Akaike
information criterion (Akaike, 1974). LSM refers to the Least Square Means. 
denotes p < 0:001,  denotes p < 0:01,  denotes p < 0:05, and y denotes p < 0:1.
41There were 3452 observations with a response time of 0 seconds.
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We observe that Response time decreases across rounds for subjects in both the high and
low load treatments. Further, subjects in the low cognitive load treatment have a longer
Response time in the rst half than subjects in the high load treatment. However, there are
no signicant di¤erences in the second half of rounds. These results are consistent with the
interpretation of the analysis summarized in Table 8 that subjects in the low load treatment
exhibit a greater amount of learning than subjects in the high load treatment.42
Interestingly, we do not nd a relationship between Response time and GPA, analogous to
that found in Table 8. On the other hand, we nd some evidence that higher GPA subjects
in the high load treatment exhibit a di¤erentially larger Response time.
Overall the analysis summarized in Table 9 is consistent with the contention that subjects
in the low load treatment are learning the strategy of the opponent better than subjects in
the high load treatment.
4.5 Mixture proportions
We now test whether the subjects mixed in the proportions as consistent with the theoretical
predictions: Up with probability 23 and Down with probability
1
3 . Here we restrict attention to
observations against Exploitative computer strategies because there are di¢ culties interpreting
the mixing proportions against the Naive computer strategies.
Similar to Palacios-Huerta and Volij (2008), and Levitt, List, and Reiley (2010), we con-
duct a binomial 2 test on each subject.43 ;44 Performing a joint test on the 76 subjects in
the high load treatment by summing their test statistics, we reject the hypothesis that, on
aggregate, they mix with these proportions, 2(76; 1) = 1026:22, p < 0:001. We also conduct
a joint binomial 2 test on 53 the subjects in the low load treatment by summing their test
statistics, and again we reject the hypothesis that they mix in proportions as consistent with
the theoretical predictions, 2(53; 1) = 774:08, p < 0:001.
42See Table A7 in the Supplimentary Online Appendix for a similar analysis but with Round, rather than
Second half, as an independent variable.
43See the Supplemental Online Appendix for the subject-level data. Note that one subject selected Down
in every period and therefore we cannot perform a binomial 2 test on this subject.
44We note that there does not exist a signicant Spearman correlation between the 2 statistic and the
Female, Game Theory, Economics, and GPA variables.
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Next we test the hypothesis that the subjects in the high and low load treatments have
identical distributions. We conduct a two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test45 on the distri-
bution of the individual 2 test statistics and we cannot reject the hypothesis that they are
identically distributed, K = 0:164, p = 0:37.46
We also test for di¤erences between the treatments using a Mann-Whitney test on the
percentage of Down actions against an Exploitative computer opponent. We nd that the
subjects in the high load treatment (54:05%) had a signicantly di¤erent mixture than subjects
in the low load treatment (56:44%), Z = 1:910, p = 0:056. However, the di¤erence between
high load (53:42%) and low load (56:30%) subjects is not signicant when we restrict attention
to the nal 25 periods of the 50 period block, Z = 1:622, p = 0:105.
To further explore this, we conduct regressions with Down as the dependent variable.
We conduct logistic regressions due to the discrete nature of the variable. We estimate an
exchangeable log odds ratio, clustered by subject. In other words, we assume a unique relation-
ship between any two observations involving a particular subject. However, we assume that
observations involving two di¤erent subjects are statistically independent. The regressions
are estimated using Generalized Estimating Equations (GEE). Since GEE is not a likelihood-
based method, Akaikes Information Criterion is not available. Therefore, we provide the
Quasilikelihood information criterion (QIC), Pan (2001). We run specications restricted
to the Exploitative WSLS treatment, to the Exploitative Mix treatment, and to the Pooled
Exploitative treatments. This analysis is summarized in Table 10.
45See Gibbons and Chakraborti (1992).
46This qualitative result is not changed when we restrict attention to the last 25 rounds of each 50 period
block, K = 0:129, p = 0:70. We also cannot reject that they come from identical distributions when we restrict
attention to the Exploitative WSLS treatment (K = 0:183, p = 0:67) or to the Exploitative Mix treatment
(K = 0:141, p = 0:91).
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Table 10: Logistic regressions of Down
Expl. WSLS Expl. Mix Pooled
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
High load  0:038  0:022  0:152  0:253y  0:152  0:174
(0:150) (0:149) (0:123) (0:150) (0:123) (0:134)
Strategy dummies No No No No Y es Y es
Repeated measures Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Demographics No Y es No Y es No Y es
QIC 4403:1 4422:2 4561:6 4545:6 8964:7 8975:4
Observations 3200 3200 3300 3300 6500 6500
LSM Di¤erence:
High load-Low load  0:038  0:022  0:152  0:253y  0:095  0:117
(0:150) (0:149) (0:123) (0:150) (0:097) (0:102)
The repeated measures regressions estimate an exchangeable log odd ratio, clus-
tered by subject. We do not provide the estimates of the intercepts, the individual
demographics variables, the log odds estimates, the strategy dummies, or the High
load-strategy dummies interactions. QIC refers to the Quasi-likelihood informa-
tion criterion (Pan, 2001). LSM refers to the Least Square Means.  denotes
p < 0:05, and y denotes p < 0:1.
Here in the Exploitative Mix treatment, we nd some weak evidence of di¤erences in Down
by cognitive load treatment. However, in the other specications, we do not nd signicant
di¤erences between the cognitive load treatments.47
Therefore, consistent with the previous literature, we nd that the subjects do not mix
in the proportions as consistent with the theoretical predictions. However, we do not nd
strong evidence of a signicant di¤erence between the mixture proportions of subjects in the
high and low load treatments. This suggests that the availability of cognitive resources is not
related to the observed deviations from the theoretical predictions of mixture proportions in
this game.
4.6 Serial correlation
Next we investigate whether the actions in our data exhibit serial correlation. As in the
previous subsection, we restrict attention to observations against an Exploitative opponent
47As expected, in the specications that are restricted to a single opponent treatment, the LSM di¤erences
are equal to the High load coe¢ cient estimates. We also note that the High load coe¢ cient estimate of (5) is
identical to that in (3) because of the designation as the reference strategy treatment.
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because the best response to a Naive opponent is serially correlated.48
In order to detect serial correlation, we perform tests of runs, as described in Gibbons and
Chakraborti (1992). A run (r) is dened to be a sequence of one or more identical actions
followed by a di¤erent action or no action at all. Given the number of Up actions (nU ) and the
number of Down actions (nD) selected by a subject, we are able to calculate the probability
of observing any feasible number of runs.49 For every subject, given nD and nU we calculate
the probability density function of the number of runs:
f(rjnU ; nD) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
2(nU 1
( r2 ) 1
)(nD 1
( r2 ) 1
)
(nD+nUnU )
if r is even
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2
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nD 1
r 3
2
)+(
nU 1
r 3
2
)(
nD 1
r 1
2
)
(nD+nUnU )
if r is odd.
From the density function, we can calculate the cumulative distribution function:
F (rjnU ; nD) =
rX
k=1
f(kjnU ; nD);
which is the probability of observing r or fewer runs. Similar to Walker and Wooders (2001),
Palacios-Huerta and Volij (2008), and Levitt, List, and Reiley (2010), we calculate two sta-
tistics, F (r   1jnU ; nD) and F (rjnU ; nD), for each subject.50 At a 5% level of signicance,
we would reject the null hypothesis of independence, if either F (rjnU ; nD) < 0:025 or if
1  F (r   1jnU ; nD) < 0:025. Because we plan to run one-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests
on these probabilities, as Walker and Wooders (2001), for each subject we take a draw from
the uniform distribution with F (rjnU ; nD) as the upper bound and F (r   1jnU ; nD) as the
lower bound. This leaves us with a single probability estimate for each subject.51 If the actions
are selected independently then these probabilities would be distributed as a uniform between
48Optimal behavior against Naive strategies would either have the largest run possible (Naive 50-50) or have
runs of 2 followed by runs of 1 (Naive pattern).
49Given nU > 0 and nD > 0, there must be at least 2 runs and the maximum possible number of runs is
equal to 2 min(nU ; nD) + 1.
50See the Supplemental Online Appendix for the subject-level data.
51We note that there does not exist a signicant Spearman correlation between these probability estimates,
and the Female, Game Theory, Economics, and GPA variables.
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0 and 1.
We perform a one-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test that the 53 probabilities associated
with subjects in the low load treatment are uniformly distributed between 0 and 1. We reject
the hypothesis that the probabilities are distributed as a uniform, K = 0:174, p = 0:071.
Figure 6 illustrates the test on subjects in the low load treatment. We also perform a one-
sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test that the 76 probabilities associated with subjects in the high
load treatment are uniformly distributed between 0 and 1. Again, we reject the hypothesis,
K = 0:246, p < 0:001. Figure 7 illustrates the test on the subjects in the high load treatment.
<<Figures 6 and 7 about here>>
While subjects in neither cognitive load treatments appear to be mixing in an independent
fashion, it remains to be seen whether the distribution associated with subjects in the high load
treatment is di¤erent from the distribution associated with subjects in the low load treatment.
We perform a two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test and we cannot reject the hypothesis that
the distributions are identical, K = 0:158, p = 0:42.52
To further investigate the question of serial correlation, we dene the Switch from previous
variable, which assumes a 1 if the choice of action is identical to that in the previous period,
and a 0 otherwise. We conduct regressions with this as the dependent variable. We note
that there are only 49 observations per subject in the regressions that follow because the rst
round of the block does not have a previous response. The regressions are otherwise identical
to those summarized in Table 10. This analysis is summarized in Table 11.
52This qualitative result remains unchanged when we restrict the analysis to the nal 25 rounds in the 50
period block, K = 0:091, p = 0:97. We also cannot reject that they come from the same distribution when
we restrict attention to the Exploitative WSLS treatment (K = 0:188, p = 0:64). However, we can reject the
hypothesis that they are the same in the Exploitative Mix treatment (K = 0:346, p = 0:047).
28
Table 11: Logistic regressions of Switch from previous
Expl. WSLS Expl. Mix Pooled
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
High load  0:186  0:202 0:304 0:394 0:304 0:326
(0:158) (0:154) (0:146) (0:179) (0:146) (0:159)
Strategy dummies No No No No Y es Y es
Repeated measures Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Demographics No Y es No Y es No Y es
QIC 4355:3 4373:5 4481:2 4485:2 8836:6 8854:4
Observations 3136 3136 3234 3234 6370 6370
LSM Di¤erence:
High load-Low load  0:186  0:202 0:304 0:394 0:059 0:076
(0:158) (0:154) (0:146) (0:179) (0:107) (0:112)
The repeated measures regressions estimate an exchangeable log odd ratio,
clustered by subject. We do not provide the estimates of the intercepts, the indi-
vidual demographics variables, the log odds estimates, the strategy dummies, or
the High load-strategy dummies interactions. QIC refers to the Quasi-likelihood
information criterion (Pan, 2001). LSM refers to the Least Square Means. 
denotes p < 0:01,  denotes p < 0:05, and y denotes p < 0:1.
We see that with an Exploitative Mix opponent, subjects in the high load treatment switch
their actions with a larger probability than the subjects in the low load treatment. However,
this di¤erence is not signicant in the Exploitative WSLS treatment or the Pooled analysis.
We interpret this as providing weak evidence of di¤erences in serial correlation by cognitive
load treatment.
5 Discussion
The experimental literature largely nds that subjects do not mix in the proportions consistent
with the theoretical predictions and that actions exhibit serial correlation. We nd these
features in our data, however we nd only weak evidence that they are related to cognitive
load. Therefore, we do not nd evidence that these standard experimental results on mixing
are associated with the available cognitive resources of the subject.
These results are reminiscent of the ndings reported in Geng et al. (2015). These au-
thors do not nd a relationship between measures of cognitive ability and either the mixture
proportions or serial correlation. Although the design of Geng et al. (adolescent subjects,
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human opponents, measures of cognitive ability) exhibit notable di¤erences from our design
(college student subjects, computer opponents, cognitive load manipulation), neither study
nds evidence of a relationship between cognition and either mixing proportions or serially
correlated actions.
We also nd surprising evidence that subjects in the high cognitive load treatment earn
more than subjects in the low cognitive load treatment, particularly in the early rounds. This
is consistent with the explanation that subjects in the high load treatment employ a simple,
stable strategy and subjects in the low load treatment engage in experimentation during those
early rounds.
In addition, we nd that subjects in the low load treatment experience increased earnings
across rounds, while those in the high load treatment do not.53 An interpretation of this
result is that the subjects with greater available cognitive resources exhibit more learning than
subjects with less.54 Our analysis of response time is also consistent with this interpretation.
This result has an intuitive appeal because remembering and analyzing previous outcomes
would seem to require available cognitive resources. For instance, Hinson, Jameson, and
Whitney (2003) nd that subjects who are under a cognitive load are more impulsive and
less analytical. Our results are also consistent with Milinski and Wedekind (1998), Du¤y
and Smith (2014), and Buckert, Oechssler, and Schwieren (2017), which report that cognitive
load a¤ects the ability of subjects in repeated games to employ information from previous
repetitions.
We refer to our results as over-experimentation, since the early round diminished earnings
associated with the experimentation are not su¢ ciently compensated by the improved earnings
due to the learning. It is possible that subjects in the low load treatment overestimated the
benet from experimenting or underestimated the cost to early round experimentation.
Whereas our results shed light on the role of cognition a¤ecting (and not a¤ecting) behavior
in games with mixed strategy equilibria, we acknowledge that there is much work to be done
53Geng et al. (2015) did not study the trajectory of earnings across rounds.
54Gill and Prowse (2016) nd a similar result, albeit in a di¤erent setting. These authors observe that
subjects with higher measured cognitive ability exhibit a faster convergence to the equilibrium prediction in a
repeated beauty contest game.
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on the topic. We leave it to future research to determine whether there is a su¢ cient number
of rounds where subjects under a low load would earn more than subjects under a high
load. Also, it is possible that subjects play a computer opponent di¤erently than a human
opponent because the computer might be expected to employ a more stable strategy. Further,
our design allows time between feedback and the choice in the game where subjects are not
under a cognitive load. We are interested to know the e¤ects of imposing a cognitive load
during this time. These and other interesting questions are a matter for future research.
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Figure 2: Screenshot of the game stage
41
Figure 3: Earnings across rounds
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Figure 4: Down across rounds
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Figure 5: Response times across rounds
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Figure 6: Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test of Runs for subjects in the low load treatment
45
Figure 7: Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test of Runs for subjects in the high load treatment
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Supplemental Online Appendix
Table 1 lists the distribution of subjects within the treatments. Table A1 also includes the
distribution within the rst and second blocks of 50 rounds.
Table A1: Distribution of subjects within treatments
High load Low load Total
Naive 50-50 32 37 69
(17; 15) (19; 18) (36; 33)
Naive Pattern 22 39 61
(10; 12) (24; 15) (34; 27)
Expl. WSLS 37 27 64
(17; 20) (12; 15) (29; 35)
Expl. Mix 39 27 66
(16; 23) (15; 12) (31; 35)
Total 130 130 260
We list the distribution of subjects across cognitive load and computer opponent
treatments. In parenthesis we list the distribution in the rst and second blocks.
There are a total of 260 observations because each of the 130 subjects played
against both a Naive and an Exploitative computer opponent strategy and played
a block in the high cognitive load treatment and a block in the low cognitive load
treatment.
The analysis summarized in Table 6 examines the relationship between Correct and Earn-
ings. One might be concerned that Correct does not distinguish an incorrect response that is
o¤ by one digit and an incorrect response that is o¤ by all 6 digits. Here we o¤er a di¤erent
specication of correct: Longest Consecutive Subsequence (LCS). The LCS is the longest cor-
rect consecutive subsequence of the response. For the high load treatment responses, the raw
value ranges between 0 and 6. However, below we normalize the values so that they range
between 0 and 1. The mean of the LCS within the high load treatment is 0:934. In the low
load treatment, Correct is identical to LCS. Therefore, we only present the analysis for the
high load treatment. We summarize this analysis in Table A2 below.
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Table A2: Earnings restricted to cognitive load treatment
High load
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
LCS 0:018  0:007  0:020  0:017  0:038
(0:051) (0:051) (0:052) (0:052) (0:058)
Strategy dummies No Y es Y es Y es Y es
Repeated measures No No Y es Y es Y es
Demographics No No No Y es Y es
GPA No No No No Y es
AIC 15658:9 15629:1 15605:8 15615:9 12371:6
Observations 6500 6500 6500 6500 5150
The repeated measures regressions estimate an exchangeable covariance ma-
trix, clustered by subject. We do not provide the estimates of the intercepts, the
individual demographics variables, the covariance estimates, or the strategy dum-
mies. AIC refers to the Akaike information criterion (Akaike, 1974). y denotes
p < 0:1.
Again, in none of the specications is there a relationship between LCS and Earnings
in that period. We interpret this as providing additional evidence that subjects correctly
expended e¤ort on the game stage even when the memorization task was not correct in that
particular round.
We employ only 4 strategies for the computer opponent. As a result, we can compare
strategic behavior against a few well-dened opponent strategies. Here we summarize regres-
sion (3) of Table 7 but restricted by computer opponent treatment. The specication includes
repeated measures and is summarized in Table A3.
Table A3: Regressions of Earnings across rounds
Naive 50-50 Naive Pattern Expl. WSLS Expl. Mix
High load  0:015 0:101  0:028 0:063y
(0:032) (0:061) (0:035) (0:032)
AIC 8832:8 6907:8 7805:5 7459:7
Observations 3450 3050 3200 3300
The regressions estimate an exchangeable covariance matrix, clustered by sub-
ject. We do not provide the estimates of the intercepts or the covariance estimates.
AIC refers to the Akaike information criterion (Akaike, 1974). y denotes p < 0:1.
Here we summarize regression (3) of Table 8 but restricted by computer opponent treat-
ment. The specication includes repeated measures and is summarized in Table A4.
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Table A4: Regressions of Earnings across rounds
Naive 50-50 Naive Pattern Expl. WSLS Expl. Mix
High load 0:044 0:090 0:024 0:089
(0:044) (0:041) (0:045) (0:042)
Second half 0:049 0:061y 0:062 0:041
(0:040) (0:035) (0:044) (0:041)
Second half*High load  0:119 0:023  0:103y  0:053
(0:059) (0:058) (0:058) (0:053)
AIC 8837:8 7035:1 7811:5 7468:1
Observations 3450 3050 3200 3300
LSM Di¤erences:
High load-Low load 0:044 0:090 0:024 0:089
for First half (0:043) (0:067) (0:045) (0:042)
High load-Low load  0:075y 0:113y  0:079y 0:036
for Second half (0:043) (0:067) (0:045) (0:042)
Second half-First half  0:070 0:084y  0:041  0:011
for High load (0:043) (0:044) (0:038) (0:034)
Second half-First half 0:049 0:061y 0:062 0:041
for Low load (0:040) (0:033) (0:044) (0:041)
The regressions estimate an exchangeable covariance matrix, clustered by sub-
ject. We do not provide the estimates of the intercepts or the covariance estimates.
AIC refers to the Akaike information criterion (Akaike, 1974). LSM refers to the
Least Square Means.  denotes p < 0:01,  denotes p < 0:05, and y denotes
p < 0:1.
Recall that we dened Round to be the number of periods under a particular computer
opponent treatment and cognitive load treatment. Therefore, Round ranges from 1 to 50.
Whereas Table 8 summarized the analysis that employed the Second half variable, here we
employ the Round variable and the interaction of Round and cognitive load treatment. This
analysis is summarized in Table A5.
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Table A5: Regressions of Earnings across rounds
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
High load 0:058 0:114 0:120 0:130 0:146 0:471
(0:029) (0:038) (0:041) (0:042) (0:046) (0:127)
Round 0:0019 0:0019 0:0019 0:0019 0:0020 0:0020
(0:0007) (0:0007) (0:0007) (0:0007) (0:0008) (0:0008)
Round*High load  0:0020  0:0020  0:0020  0:0020  0:0019y  0:0019y
(0:00098) (0:00098) (0:00097) (0:00097) (0:0011) (0:0011)
GPA         0:046 0:093
(0:023) (0:029)
GPA*High load            0:097
(0:035)
Strategy dummies No Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Repeated measures No No Y es Y es Y es Y es
Demographics No No No Y es Y es Y es
AIC 31300:9 31239:6 31216:8 31230:1 24785:8 24783:1
Observations 13; 000 13; 000 13,000 13,000 10,300 10,300
The repeated measures regressions estimate an exchangeable covariance ma-
trix, clustered by subject. We do not provide the estimates of the intercepts, the
individual demographics variables, the covariance estimates, the strategy dum-
mies, or the High load-strategy dummies interactions. AIC refers to the Akaike
information criterion (Akaike, 1974).  denotes p < 0:001,  denotes p < 0:01, 
denotes p < 0:05, and y denotes p < 0:1.
The positive and signicant high load coe¢ cient suggests that subjects in the high load
treatment earn more in the early rounds. However, we observe a positive and signicant
Round coe¢ cient in addition to a negative and signicant Round-High load interaction. This
indicates that the subjects in the low load treatment exhibit improved earnings across rounds,
however, the subjects in the high load treatment do not exhibit such an improvement. This
nding is robust to the specication of the analysis and is consistent with the results of Table
8.
Here we summarize regression (3) of Table A5 but restricted by computer opponent treat-
ment. The specication includes repeated measures and is summarized in Table A6.
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Table A6: Regressions of Earnings across rounds
Naive 50-50 Naive Pattern Expl. WSLS Expl. Mix
High load 0:099 0:0464 0:0577 0:0848
(0:061) (0:0786) (0:0622) (0:0566)
Round 0:0025y 0:0017 0:0018 0:0014
(0:0014) (0:0012) (0:0015) (0:0014)
Round*High load  0:0045 0:0022  0:0034y  0:0009
(0:0021) (0:0019) (0:0020) (0:0018)
AIC 8850:3 6922:2 7825:3 7481:5
Observations 3450 3050 3200 3300
The regressions estimate an exchangeable covariance matrix, clustered by sub-
ject. We do not provide the estimates of the intercepts or the covariance estimates.
AIC refers to the Akaike information criterion (Akaike, 1974).  denotes p < 0:01,
 denotes p < 0:05, and y denotes p < 0:1.
We run the analogous regressions as summarized in Table 9 but we employ the Round
variable rather than the Second half variable. This analysis is summarized in Table A7.
Table A7: Regressions of the natural log of Response time across rounds
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
High load  0:076  0:214  0:258  0:235  0:223  0:342
(0:017) (0:022) (0:048) (0:050) (0:057) (0:084)
Round  0:0084  0:0084  0:0084  0:0084  0:0075  0:0075
(0:0004) (0:0004) (0:0004) (0:0004) (0:0004) (0:0004)
Round*High load 0:0017 0:0017 0:0017 0:0017 0:0007 0:0007
(0:0006) (0:0006) (0:0005) (0:0005) (0:0006) (0:0006)
GPA         0:0200 0:0032
(0:0549) (0:0557)
GPA*High load           0:0355y
(0:0183)
Strategy dummies No Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Repeated measures No No Y es Y es Y es Y es
Demographics No No No Y es Y es Y es
AIC 17751:6 17530:9 14154:4 14160:8 11212:3 11214:7
Observations 13; 000 13,000 13,000 13,000 10,300 10,300
The repeated measures regressions estimate an exchangeable covariance ma-
trix, clustered by subject. We do not provide the estimates of the intercepts, the
individual demographics variables, the covariance estimates, the strategy dum-
mies, or the High load-strategy dummies interactions. AIC refers to the Akaike
information criterion (Akaike, 1974).  denotes p < 0:001,  denotes p < 0:01, 
denotes p < 0:05, and y denotes p < 0:1.
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Table A7 provides evidence consistent with that in Table 9. Subjects in the high load
treatment take less time to reach their decisions in the early rounds. This is possibly done in
an e¤ort to quickly proceed to the memorization task. We also observe that Response time
decreases across rounds for subjects in the low load treatment. In addition, the Round-High
load interaction suggests that subjects in the low load treatment exhibit a greater increase in
the decision speed across rounds than subjects in the high load treatment. This is consistent
with the interpretation that subjects in the low load treatment exhibit a greater amount of
learning than subjects in the high load treatment.
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Low Load against Exploitative opponent
Subject #Down 2 p-value Runs F (r) F (r   1) U draw
2 22 2:56 0:110 25 0:483 0:371 0:387
3 22 2:56 0:110 31 0:956 0:921 0:939
4 25 6:25 0:012 21 0:099 0:058 0:058
6 23 3:61 0:057 19 0:033 0:017 0:031
9 28 11:56 < 0:001 32 0:977 0:956 0:962
13 27 9:61 0:002 26 0:576 0:460 0:506
16 28 11:56 < 0:001 20 0:068 0:037 0:060
20 22 2:56 0:110 42 0:999 0:999 0:999
22 49 94:09 < 0:001 3 1:000 0:040 0:202
27 24 4:84 0:028 37 0:999 0:999 0:999
30 22 2:56 0:110 34 0:995 0:989 0:990
31 29 13:69 < 0:001 33 0:992 0:983 0:989
33 25 6:25 0:012 32 0:969 0:942 0:955
34 18 0:16 0:689 29 0:959 0:916 0:934
43 31 18:49 < 0:001 26 0:718 0:612 0:650
47 33 24:01 < 0:001 16 0:014 0:006 0:012
49 27 9:61 0:002 34 0:994 0:987 0:990
52 22 2:56 0:110 28 0:796 0:704 0:714
53 27 9:61 0:002 24 0:351 0:250 0:286
62 25 6:25 0:0124 30 0:902 0:841 0:872
64 17 0:01 0:9203 21 0:270 0:172 0:218
65 32 21:16 < 0:001 24 0:550 0:434 0:497
67 50     1 0 0 0
68 29 13:69 < 0:001 26 0:629 0:516 0:556
70 24 4:84 0:028 19 0:0314 0:016 0:020
71 28 11:56 < 0:001 30 0:921 0:869 0:902
77 27 9:61 0:002 31 0:949 0:911 0:920
78 33 24:01 < 0:001 15 0:0061 0:002 0:003
102 30 16:00 < 0:001 25 0:559 0:438 0:535
Camden subjects are labeled 1  78. Haverford subjects are labeled 101  152. Among the
50 decisions against an Exploitative opponent, we report the number of down actions, the 2
statistic and the corresponding p-value as discussed in subsection 4:5. We report the number
of runs, the two CDF statistics, and the draw of the uniform between these, as discussed in
subsection 4:6.
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Low Load against Exploitative opponent
Subject #Down 2 p-value Runs F (r) F (r   1) U draw
103 34 27:04 < 0:001 21 0:341 0:223 0:326
105 48 88:36 < 0:001 4 0:118 0:041 0:075
110 25 6:25 0:012 21 0:098 0:058 0:067
112 35 30:25 < 0:001 26 0:936 0:892 0:932
119 28 11:56 < 0:001 26 0:598 0:483 0:575
120 25 6:25 0:012 26 0:558 0:442 0:467
121 34 27:04 < 0:001 16 0:021 0:009 0:017
125 27 9:61 0:002 36 0:999 0:998 0:998
128 36 33:64 < 0:001 23 0:805 0:663 0:793
130 30 16:00 < 0:001 25 0:559 0:438 0:480
131 25 6:25 0:012 25 0:442 0:335 0:388
134 22 2:56 0:110 28 0:796 0:704 0:791
136 25 6:25 0:012 22 0:159 0:098 0:149
137 27 9:61 0:002 17 0:008 0:003 0:007
140 41 53:29 < 0:001 14 0:237 0:151 0:195
141 24 4:84 0:028 25 0:447 0:339 0:399
142 25 6:25 0:012 28 0:763 0:665 0:683
144 23 3:61 0:057 20 0:062 0:033 0:052
145 28 11:56 < 0:001 26 0:598 0:483 0:561
146 25 6:25 0:012 29 0:841 0:763 0:818
147 24 4:84 0:028 24 0:339 0:240 0:270
149 36 33:64 < 0:001 19 0:282 0:167 0:219
150 25 6:25 0:012 27 0:665 0:558 0:641
151 30 16:00 < 0:001 29 0:912 0:850 0:889
152 23 3:61 0:057 33 0:987 0:973 0:973
Camden subjects are labeled 1  78. Haverford subjects are labeled 101  152. Among the
50 decisions against an Exploitative opponent, we report the number of down actions, the 2
statistic and the corresponding p-value as discussed in subsection 4:5. We report the number
of runs, the two CDF statistics, and the draw of the uniform between these, as discussed in
subsection 4:6.
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High Load against Exploitative opponent
Subject #Down 2 p-value Runs F (r) F (r   1) U draw
1 36 33:64 < 0:001 19 0:282 0:167 0:189
5 24 4:84 0:028 28 0:767 0:669 0:716
7 26 7:84 0:005 28 0:767 0:669 0:743
8 28 11:56 < 0:001 26 0:598 0:483 0:501
10 9 5:29 0:021 17 0:829 0:576 0:613
11 31 18:49 < 0:001 19 0:063 0:033 0:059
12 31 18:49 < 0:001 21 0:177 0:109 0:122
14 22 2:56 0:110 32 0:977 0:956 0:974
15 30 16:00 < 0:001 19 0:051 0:026 0:045
17 23 3:61 0:057 31 0:949 0:911 0:925
18 22 2:56 0:110 16 0:004 0:001 0:003
19 20 1:00 0:317 33 0:995 0:988 0:990
21 40 49:00 < 0:001 16 0:368 0:260 0:349
23 35 30:25 < 0:001 23 0:699 0:551 0:581
24 32 21:16 < 0:001 17 0:021 0:001 0:014
25 37 37:21 < 0:001 24 0:942 0:902 0:916
26 29 13:69 < 0:001 32 0:983 0:966 0:983
28 38 40:96 < 0:001 17 0:254 0:135 0:208
29 21 1:69 0:194 25 0:516 0:399 0:496
32 32 21:16 < 0:001 28 0:916 0:862 0:913
35 25 6:25 0:012 23 0:237 0:159 0:163
36 26 7:84 0:005 37 0:999 0:998 0:999
37 20 1:00 0:317 30 0:950 0:912 0:947
38 28 11:56 < 0:001 25 0:483 0:371 0:440
39 28 11:56 < 0:001 30 0:921 0:869 0:869
Camden subjects are labeled 1  78. Haverford subjects are labeled 101  152. Among the
50 decisions against an Exploitative opponent, we report the number of down actions, the 2
statistic and the corresponding p-value as discussed in subsection 4:5. We report the number
of runs, the two CDF statistics, and the draw of the uniform between these, as discussed in
subsection 4:6.
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High Load against Exploitative opponent
Subject #Down 2 p-value Runs F (r) F (r   1) U draw
40 23 3:61 0:057 23 0:250 0:169 0:193
41 24 4:84 0:028 27 0:669 0:562 0:610
42 21 1:69 0:194 27 0:735 0:629 0:673
44 49 94:09 < 0:001 3 1 0:04 0:929
45 18 0:16 0:689 26 0:772 0:676 0:676
46 19 0:49 0:484 22 0:264 0:177 0:185
48 28 11:56 < 0:001 34 0:995 0:989 0:990
50 31 18:49 < 0:001 16 0:007 0:003 0:005
51 33 24:01 < 0:001 21 0:270 0:172 0:230
54 31 18:49 < 0:001 25 0:612 0:488 0:539
55 22 2:56 0:110 27 0:704 0:598 0:655
56 29 13:69 < 0:001 20 0:077 0:043 0:077
57 23 3:61 0:057 27 0:682 0:576 0:659
58 23 3:61 0:057 22 0:169 0:105 0:120
59 25 6:25 0:012 32 0:969 0:942 0:948
60 28 11:56 < 0:001 29 0:869 0:796 0:851
61 32 21:16 < 0:001 21 0:217 0:135 0:193
63 23 3:61 0:057 28 0:778 0:682 0:744
66 30 16:00 < 0:001 30 0:950 0:912 0:946
69 23 3:61 0:057 25 0:460 0:351 0:368
72 24 4:84 0:028 33 0:985 0:970 0:984
73 20 1:00 0:317 20 0:090 0:051 0:051
74 22 2:56 0:110 36 0:999 0:998 0:999
75 33 24:01 < 0:001 7 0:000 0:000 0:000
76 49 94:09 < 0:001 3 1 0:04 0:296
Camden subjects are labeled 1  78. Haverford subjects are labeled 101  152. Among the
50 decisions against an Exploitative opponent, we report the number of down actions, the 2
statistic and the corresponding p-value as discussed in subsection 4:5. We report the number
of runs, the two CDF statistics, and the draw of the uniform between these, as discussed in
subsection 4:6.
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High Load against Exploitative opponent
Subject #Down 2 p-value Runs F (r) F (r   1) U draw
101 31 18:49 < 0:001 30 0:965 0:936 0:951
104 31 18:49 < 0:001 27 0:815 0:718 0:727
106 27 9:61 0:002 35 0:998 0:994 0:997
107 28 11:56 < 0:001 31 0:956 0:921 0:952
108 24 4:84 0:028 24 0:339 0:240 0:271
109 23 3:61 0:057 23 0:250 0:169 0:224
111 21 1:69 0:194 26 0:629 0:516 0:549
113 24 4:84 0:028 29 0:844 0:767 0:816
114 20 1:00 0:317 31 0:975 0:950 0:952
115 20 1:00 0:317 24 0:438 0:327 0:372
116 24 4:84 0:028 29 0:844 0:767 0:832
117 24 4:84 0:028 33 0:985 0:970 0:984
118 24 4:84 0:028 32 0:970 0:944 0:953
122 19 0:49 0:484 16 0:007 0:003 0:004
123 29 13:69 < 0:001 18 0:022 0:010 0:017
124 27 9:61 0:002 27 0:682 0:576 0:612
126 24 4:84 0:028 30 0:904 0:844 0:861
127 30 16:00 < 0:001 31 0:975 0:950 0:958
129 42 57:76 < 0:001 17 1 0:822 0:937
132 24 4:84 0:028 40 0:999 0:999 0:999
133 29 13:69 < 0:001 30 0:935 0:889 0:891
135 24 4:84 0:028 30 0:904 0:844 0:858
138 26 7:84 0:005 28 0:767 0:669 0:691
139 26 7:84 0:005 30 0:904 0:844 0:889
143 26 7:84 0:005 21 0:100 0:059 0:071
148 31 18:49 < 0:001 29 0:936 0:883 0:916
Camden subjects are labeled 1  78. Haverford subjects are labeled 101  152. Among the
50 decisions against an Exploitative opponent, we report the number of down actions, the 2
statistic and the corresponding p-value as discussed in subsection 4:5. We report the number
of runs, the two CDF statistics, and the draw of the uniform between these, as discussed in
subsection 4:6.
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